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From an Outsider’s Point of View: 




In his Repastinatio . . . Lorenzo Valla launched a heavy attack on Aristotelian-scholastic 
thought. While most of this book is devoted to metaphysics, language and argumenta-
tion, Valla also incorporates chapters on the soul and natural philosophy. Using as 
criteria good Latin, common sense and common observation, he rejected much of 
standard Aristotelian teaching on the soul, replacing the hylopmorphic account of the 
scholastics by an Augustinian one. In this article his arguments on the soul’s autonomy, 
nobility and independency from the body are studied and analysed. His critique of 
Aristotle’s opinions on natural phenomena as being untrue to what we observe will 
also be brieﬂ y studied. His arguments do not show him always to be deep or consistent 
thinker, but the critical review of Aristotelian philosophy proceeds from some philo-
sophically interesting assumptions. Moreover, from a broader historical perspective his 
undermining of Aristotle’s authority may be regarded as a contribution to the ﬁ nal 
demise of the Aristotelian paradigm, even though the humanist critique was just one 
factor in this process.
 Keywords 
Lorenzo Valla, soul, humanism, Augustianianism
1. Introduction: An Archcritic of Aristotelian Philosophy in our Midst?
Today one no longer needs to excuse bringing humanism into a discussion on 
Aristotelian traditions regarding the scientia de anima.1 Humanists contrib-
1) See Dennis Des Chene, Life’s Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul (Ithaca, N.Y, 
2000), 11 n. 3 on the term “scientia de anima”. Th e term “psychologia” was coined by the Ger-
man humanist Joannes Th omas Freigius in 1575 (Kathleen Park and Eckhard Kessler, “Th e 
Concept of Psychology”, in Th e Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. C. Schmitt, 
Q. Skinner and E. Kessler (Cambridge/New York, 1988), 455-463, 455.




uted signiﬁ cantly to the rediscovery, dissemination and understanding of a 
great number of important texts on natural philosophy, medicine, and math-
ematics. Th rough textual studies, they also inﬂ uenced scientiﬁ c practices and 
techniques, as well as fostered new ideas on scientiﬁ c methodology.2 Human-
ists interested in Aristotelian psychology turned to the Greek text of the De 
anima. New translations were made, though older ones, particularly that of 
William of Moerbeke, remained in use.3 Th ey also explored the ancient com-
mentary tradition on Aristotle, editing and translating the works of, for exam-
ple, Philoponus, Simplicius and Th emistius.
Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457), however, is not generally associated with natu-
ral philosophy or psychology. Certainly, Valla was one of the most important 
humanists of Quattrocento Italy. His Elegantiae linguae Latinae became an 
international bestseller and gave the humanist programme some of its most 
trenchant and combative formulations. Valla has long been understood to be 
an extremely hostile critic of all things Aristotelian—someone who accused 
the entire natio peripatetica of presenting a skewed picture of the supernatural 
and natural world, and of man. Th is picture, he implied, was based on their 
complete misunderstanding of Latin and of the workings of language more 
generally. Valla thus attacked the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition tout court, 
disproving of their language, methods and approaches.4
2) See Ann Blair and Anthony Grafton, “Reassessing Humanism and Science”, Journal of the 
History of Ideas 53 (1992) 529-540, and Anthony Grafton and Nancy Siraisi, “Introduction”, in 
Natural Particulars. Nature and the Disciplines in Renaissance Europe, ed. A. Grafton and N. Sir-
aisi (Cambridge, 1999), 1-21, for a resumé of the historiographical debates, with further litera-
ture. For an excellent survey see Luca Bianchi, “Continuity and Change in the Aristotelian 
Tradition”, in Th e Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. J. Hankins (Cambridge, 
2007), 49-71, as well as his Studi sull’Aristotelismo del Rinascimento (Padua, 2003). Cf. also Ste-
phen Menn, “Th e Intellectual Setting”, in Th e Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philoso-
phy, ed. Daniel Garbers and Michael Ayers (Cambridge/New York, 1998), 33-86, esp. 78 
n. 35.
3) Eugenio Garin, “Le traduzioni umanistiche di Aristotele nel secolo XV”, Atti dell’Accademia 
ﬁ orentina di scienze morali ‘La Colombaria’ 16 (1951) 55-104; Ferdinand E. Cranz, “Perspectives 
de la Renaissance sur le ‘De Anima’”, Platon et Aristote à la Renaissance: XVIe Colloque interna-
tional de Tours (Paris, 1976), 359-76; Charles B. Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance (Cam-
bridge, 1983), 64-88; Ferdinand E. Cranz and Charles B. Schmitt, A Bibliography of Aristotle 
Editions, 1501-1600, 2nd ed. (Baden-Baden, 1984), 165-67; Park and Kessler, “Concept of 
Psychology”, 458. In the ﬁ fteenth century De anima was translated by the Byzantine émigrés 
George of Trebizond and Johannes Argyropoulos; at least ﬁ ve more translations into Latin fol-
lowed in the sixteenth century.
4) A critical discussion of Valla’s programme is presented in my forthcoming book In Defense of 
Common Sense. Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy (I Tatti Studies in 
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Although such an attitude, which is not only speciﬁ cally anti-Aristotelian 
but also generally anti-philosophical, may not initially seem useful for consid-
ering transformations in Aristotelian psychology, there are several reasons why 
it is interesting to bring Valla into the picture. Valla did in fact write about the 
soul—namely in the context of his attacks on Aristotelian-scholastic thought. 
As he himself observes, his reformation of Aristotelian metaphysics and dialec-
tics had to include moral and natural philosophy; indeed the chapter on natu-
ral philosophy in his Dialectica is among the longest in the work.5 Th ese are not 
the most widely studied parts of Valla’s corpus, and it is worthwhile to explore 
both his treatment of these themes and their relationship to his broader critical 
aims. My contribution, however, is limited to his remarks on the soul.
Various scholars have argued that Valla’s criticisms of Aristotelian natural 
philosophy helped pave the way for innovation in the philosophy and science 
of the later Renaissance. For instance, Charles Trinkaus has stressed the nature 
of Valla’s empiricism, which appeals to common sense and observation. 
Th ough careful to avoid securing “a place for Valla in the history of natural 
science”, Trinkaus concedes that Valla, “does have a place as part of the inter-
nal dissidence within the dominant natural philosophy of his own age, the late 
middle ages and the Renaissance”.6  Other scholars have located Valla more 
ﬁ rmly within the tradition of dissident thinkers, which ﬁ nally culminated in 
the rise of the new science of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Gianni Zippel thus has suggested that Valla foreshadowed Renaissance natu-
ralism in formulating positions which “prelude late-Renaissance solutions of 
Telesio”.7 Zippel views Valla’s position as “the ﬁ rst conscious anticipation in 
Renaissance History I, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., March 2009). Th is article 
is based on parts of chapter 4. Some of the same ground is covered in Lodi Nauta, “Lorenzo 
Valla’s Critique of Aristotelian Psychology”, Vivarium 41 (2003), 120-143. I shall refrain from 
giving extensive documentation here. See esp. C. Vasoli, La dialettica e la retorica dell’Umanesimo 
(Milan, 1968), 28-77, P. Mack, Renaissance Argument. Renaissance Argument. Valla and Agricola 
in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic (Leiden, 1993), M. Laﬀ ranchi, Dialettica e ﬁ losoﬁ a in 
Lorenzo Valla (Milan, 1999); L. Nauta, “William of Ockham and Lorenzo Valla: False Friends. 
Semantics and Ontological Reduction”, Renaissance Quarterly 56 (2003), 613-651; idem, “Val-
la’s Critique”; idem, “Lorenzo Valla and the Rise of Humanist Dialectic”, in Th e Cambridge 
Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. J. Hankins (Cambridge/New York, 2007), 193-210.
5) Valla, Repastinatio dialectice et philosophie, ed. Gianni Zippel, Padua 1982, 2 vols (= Valla 
1982), vol. I, 7.
6) Charles Trinkaus, “Lorenzo Valla’s Anti-Aristotelian Natural Philosophy”, I Tatti Studies. 
Essays in the Renaissance 5 (1993), 279-325, 322.
7) Zippel’s introduction to Valla 1982, I, cxviii (“la prima consapevole anticipazione storica del 
pensiero di Bacone”).
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history of Bacon’s thought”, and claims that his interests in natural science 
were based “on a very precise inductive and experimental approach”.8 Not dis-
similarly, Riccardo Fubini placed Valla’s Repastinatio in the tradition of “la via 
dell’empirismo razionalistico moderno”, despite admitting its limited inﬂ u-
ence on Valla’s contemporaries. Th is “road of modern rationalist empiricism . . . 
only much later in the age of Bacon and Descartes, would become the ambi-
tious foundation of the New Science of knowledge”.9 
Valla has been linked not only to later developments in the Renaissance, 
but also to the so-called critical tendencies in later medieval thought, 
especially the nominalism of William of Ockham. Indeed, it has become 
something of an orthodoxy to call Valla a  “nominalist” and an “Ockhamist” 
on account of his simple ontology and his critique of abstract terms. More-
over, Valla’s account of the soul has been linked to Ockham, since both seem 
to reject species as a kind of intermediary in the process of cognition.10
Th e nature of Valla’s general programme—an anti-philosophical crusade 
against the Aristotelian-scholastic worldview—is also valuable to the under-
standing of Aristotelian psychology because his agenda is carried out using 
some philosophically interesting ideas and approaches. After all, the history of 
philosophy is shaped not only by its practitioners but also by its critics. A 
modern historian can acknowledge and analyse ideas without necessarily 
endorsing them. Valla’s strategy is to attack what he considers the “funda-
menta” of the Aristotelian ediﬁ ce.11 Th is does not require an examination of 
each and every stone. Rather, for him it is suﬃ  cient to demonstrate that the 
foundations of the ediﬁ ce are highly unstable; they were built upon the quick-
sand of a language and methodology largely unrelated to the ways in which 
people normally view and describe the world. Valla therefore strives to present 
an alternative to that scholastic approach, which he ﬁ nds abstract, theoretical 
and rather unscientiﬁ c. He wants to study words, propositions and argumen-
tations as they occur in real life situations, understanding each in the original 
 8) Zippel’s introduction to Valla 1982, I, cxviii and cxviii-cxx (“una più precisa impostazione 
induttiva e sperimentale della ricerca”).
 9) Riccardo Fubini, “Contributo per l’interpretazione della Dialectica di Lorenzo Valla”, in 
Filosoﬁ a e scienza classica, arabo-latina medievale e l’età moderna, ed. G. F. Vescovini (Louvain-la-
Neuve, 1999), 289-316, 316 (“via dell’empirismo razionalistico moderno”).
10) Trinkaus, “Valla’s Anti-Aristotelian Natural Philosophy”, 301. For criticisms of this interpre-
tation of Valla as a nominalist see Lodi Nauta, “William of Ockham and Lorenzo Valla” and 
idem, In Defense of Common Sense, ch. 1-3.
11) See e.g. the title of the second version Reconcinnatio totius dialectice et fundamentorum univer-
salis philosophie. Valla’s text is extant in three versions (see below, section 2).
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context from which it derives its meaning and function.12 Th e basis for Valla’s 
rejection of scholastic thought is thus two-fold: valid human knowledge 
requires both a common sense picture of the world and a language—that is, 
good classical Latin—which possesses all the resources and reﬁ nement neces-
sary to describe that world. Th e latter, at least, was fairly typical of humanist 
tastes.
Signiﬁ cantly, Valla’s objective was more than merely aesthetic; it constituted 
a serious philosophical message: the linguistic basis of law, theology, philoso-
phy and in fact of all intellectual activities. Th e programme accordingly 
attempts to make the study of language into an incisive tool, one able to 
expose all manner of errors and misunderstandings. Valla also assumes that the 
use of language is far from harmless, since it is essential to thinking and writ-
ing. Consequently, whoever misunderstands either words or their use will 
inevitably fall prey to muddled thinking and empty theorizing. It is not neces-
sary to agree with this as a diagnosis of scholastic thought, to allow that Valla’s 
position is philosophically relevant.
Th is discussion of the soul is but one of the many questions and issues raised 
by Valla’s position. Th e account is neither terribly profound nor relatively orig-
inal. It is not even a particularly representative example of his general pro-
gramme: the binding of philosophical speculation to what the senses can 
register and to that which a particular language—namely, classical Latin—can 
express through grammar.  Nevertheless it contains some thought-provoking 
arguments and ideas. Valla’s thorough simpliﬁ cation of the traditional picture 
may be regarded as one type of answer to the Aristotelian paradigm: one can 
also reform a paradigm by simply ignoring the questions and issues which 
form its core (which is not to say that this was Valla’s only tactic.)
Before turning our focus to Valla’s discussion of the soul, it may be helpful 
to introduce his Dialectica, in which his critique of Aristotelian-scholastic phi-
losophy is mainly found.
2. Valla’s Dialectica 
Valla began his Dialectica in Pavia in the early 1430s; the ﬁ rst version is enti-
tled Repastinatio dialectice et philosophie (the recultivating or resowing of the 
12) See Nauta, “Lorenzo Valla and the Rise of Humanist Dialectic”, and idem, In Defense of Com-
mon Sense.
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traditional ground of dialectic and philosophy).13 Th e work is no less ambi-
tious than its title suggests. In Book I Valla attempts to undermine Aristotelian-
scholastic metaphysics by criticising a number of its fundamental tenets. Some 
of the precepts which come under particular ﬁ re from Valla include: the ten 
categories—substance, and the nine accidental ones, including quality, quan-
tity and relation); the six transcendental terms such as “good”, “one” and 
“true”; concepts—the predicables, such as genus and species, by which a thing 
can be deﬁ ned and placed in the so-called tree of Porphyry; form and matter, 
and act and potency. According to Valla, whenever these terms, concepts, and 
distinctions are couched in ungrammatical or even rebarbative Latin, they 
complicate and confuse one’s understanding of the world, rather than enlighten 
or clarify it. Valla maintains that one’s understanding should be based on com-
mon sense and expressed in good, classical Latin. Book I further includes chap-
ters on material and spiritual substance. Th e former constitute a critique of 
Aristotelian natural philosophy; the latter treat God, the soul and the virtues.
Valla follows this analysis with an attempt in Books II and III to convert the 
formal scholastic study of Aristotelian logic into a rhetorical-grammatical dia-
lectic, one tailored to the practical needs of public debate, communication 
and argumentation. Seeking to considerably extend the range of admissible 
arguments, Valla draws upon Cicero, Quintilian and the Roman ideal of the 
orator. Accordingly, he is less concerned with the formal validity of argumen-
tation, which he ﬁ nds rather narrow if not insipid, and more concerned with 
its practical eﬃ  cacy. Does it convince its audience? Th us Valla rejects the for-
mal approach of the scholastics in favour of a dialectic based on real language, 
on arguments studied in context. And what counts as context for Valla is far 
more expansive than the single sentence structure of the scholastic example.
He continued to work on the Dialectica, undertaking a major revision in 
the 1440s while at the court of King Alfonso of Aragon. A second revision was 
cut short by Valla’s death in 1457. None of the three surviving versions of the 
text achieved a breadth of circulation remotely comparable to that of Valla’s 
handbook on Latin, the Elegantiae linguae Latinae. Nevertheless, Book I of the 
Dialectica—or Repastinatio as I prefer to call it, after the ﬁ rst version—is of 
special relevance for our purposes.14
13) Or perhaps rather: “cutting back”, “weeding out”, “repastinatio” being used in this sense by 
Tertullian in his Exhortatio castitatis; noticed by Erika Rummel, Th e Humanist-Scholastic Debate 
in the Renaissance and the Reformation (Cambridge, 1995), 156. 
14) For the text see Zippel’s edition. Vol. 1 (pp. 1-356) contains Valla’s third version, including a 
critical apparatus which lists variant readings from the second version. Vol. 2 (pp. 357-598) 
contains the ﬁ rst version.  
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Here, employing an alternative ontology—a rather grand word which he 
would strongly dislike—Valla challenges that of the scholastics. His own is 
very simple: the world consists of things; these things can be analysed as sub-
stances with their respective qualities and acts.15 Th e primary things, therefore, 
are not substances, since substance cannot exist by itself; it is always already 
informed by quality. Th ese are called things (res) by Valla, a simple common 
word which he obviously likes. Th e three categories into which a thing can be 
analysed are also called things: quality is a thing, action is a thing and sub-
stance is a thing. Hence, “thing” is a transcendental term, transcending the 
categories; in fact, it is the only transcendental term: the other ﬁ ve or six—
good, one, being, and so forth—can all be reduced to thing.16 To another basic 
division, that between body and soul (or spirit), Valla adds a third class which 
he calls “animal”, consisting of both and rather similar to the Aristotelian 
notion of the composite.17 
Valla does not arrive at this picture by systematically reviewing all of the 
doctrines of the scholastics, but by assuming that language gives us a direct 
approach to the world. Behind his triad—substance, quality and action—
clearly lie the grammatical categories of noun, adjective and adverb, and verb. 
Hence, there is no need for other accidental categories such as relation, quan-
tity, place or time. Grammatically, these too are qualities of things. Th us being 
two meters tall is a quality, as is being white or a father. Th is conclusion leads 
Valla to explore in detail the multifarious ways through which things are talked 
about, and many observations he makes here are pertinent and interesting.18
Not that there is a simple one to one relationship between language and the 
world. Valla notes many instances where the superﬁ cial grammar of an expres-
sion can mislead; a verb, for instance does not always refer to an action. And 
when one states that qualities are things which “are present to the substance”, 
this wrongly suggests that they can exist apart from one another, but, Valla 
says, “we cannot speak otherwise”.19 In general, however, the grammatical and 
semantical features of classical Latin oﬀ er reliable guidelines for expressing our 
views of the world, ourselves and our beliefs. In Valla’s mind the Latin of the 
15) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 46-50, 110-115, 127-134, 134-156, and in fact passim. For a good 
discussion see Mack, Renaissance Argument, 22-116. A more extensive treatment can be found in 
chapters 1-3 of my In Defense of Common Sense.
16) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 11-21.
17) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 49, 422-424.
18) See esp. Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 134-156.
19) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 365. 
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great authors of antiquity is closely connected with the common speech of the 
people (populus). I shall not discuss his rationale,20 but it is important to realise 
that, for Valla, classical Latin is not only a language suited for higher intellec-
tual and literary pursuits such as oratory, poetry and composition, but also an 
instrument for speaking, writing and thinking about the world in general. It 
is semantically precise, syntactically complex and rich in vocabulary. Whoever 
lacks this facultas loquendi is bound to go wrong in speaking, writing and 
thinking.21 Th roughout the discussion, Valla lets himself be ruled by this idea 
that good Latin is the perfect vehicle for expressing our common worldview, 
assuming that what common sense tells us is plain enough.
3. Valla’s Discussion of the Soul
Having sketched some of Valla’s main ideas, it is now possible to consider his 
discussion of the soul. Th is, together with his chapter on God, consitutes 
Valla’s account of “incorporeal substance” (or spirit), which is followed by a 
long discussion of “corporeal substance” (body). Valla advances an under-
standing of God and the soul that is strikingly similar to his representation of 
a thing—by deﬁ nition, consisting of substance, quality and action. Th us, as 
Valla says in the ﬁ rst version of his work, God is divine substance—the three 
Persons of which can be called qualities.22 Such a formulation could easily lead 
to accusations of Sabellian heresy, according to which each Person of the Trin-
ity is merely a mode or aspect of the one Godhead. Th ough it was not his 
intention to give support to heretical views, Valla was duly lined up by later 
critics of Trinitarian theology such as Lelio Sozzini.
Th e same model of substance-plus-qualities is applied to the soul.23 Valla 
compares both God and the soul to the sun—a favourite and traditional 
20) See Mirko Tavoni, Latino, grammatica, volgare: Storia di una questione umanistica (Padua, 
1984), Silvia Rizzo, Ricerche sul latino umanistico (Rome, 2002) Mariangela Regoliosi, “Le Ele-
gantie del Valla come ‘grammatica’ antinormativa”, Studi di grammatica italiana 19 (2000), 
315-336, and Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense (“Conclusion”). 
21) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 5, 145, 278 and elsewhere.
22) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 402-408. For Valla’s controversial ideas on the Trinity see Salvatore 
Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla: Umanesimo e teologia (Florence, 1972); Charles Trinkaus, “Lorenzo 
Valla on the Problem of Speaking about the Trinity”, Th e Journal of the History of Ideas 57 (1996) 
27-53, and Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense, ch. 6.
23) For his chapter on the soul see Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 59-73 (second and third version) and 
408-419 (ﬁ rst version). I shall not treat the diﬀ erences between them here.
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analogy.24 Th e sun is substance with three essential qualities (or, as Valla pre-
fers to say, natural qualities): vibration, light and heat. Th ese qualities are also 
found in the three Persons of the Trinity, as well as in the human soul—the 
three essential qualities of which are memory, reason and will. Th e activities of 
the soul are thus compared to the vibrating and radiant beams of the sun by 
which things are grasped, illuminated and heated:25
sun vibratus lux ardor
soul memory reason will
God eternitas sapientia bonitas
Using this model and argument, Valla stresses that the soul is a substance, not 
a quality. As he says: a substance—that is, a composite thing—is made of mat-
ter and form, and the soul is likewise a substance, being made of body (or 
rather essence) and form.26
Valla thus does not accept the Aristotelian deﬁ nition of the soul as “the 
substance (ousia) in the sense of the form of a natural body having life poten-
tially within it” (“necessarium animam usiam esse, ut speciem corporis natu-
ralis potentia vitam habentis”). Th ough Valla quotes the deﬁ nition, he does 
not really discuss it. Th is deﬁ nition, however, was absolutely fundamental to 
the scholastics. Each word, as one scholar recently said, became “a site of con-
tention, a ‘point of heresy’ dividing one school from another”.27 In Valla’s 
account, form is the same as quality and the soul is simply not a quality—not 
of a human or an animal being; calling it a substantial form would not change 
24) On the place of the sun in Renaissance thinking, see Eugenio Garin, La cultura ﬁ losoﬁ ca del 
Rinascimento italiano (Florence, 1961), 432-441; Charles Trinkaus, “Italian Humanism and 
Scholastic Th eology”, in Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms and Legacy, 3 vols., ed. 
Albert Rabil, Jr., (Philadelphia, 1988). Mario Fois, Il pensiero cristiano di Lorenzo Valla nel quadro 
storico-culturale del suo ambiente (Rome, 1969), 541 points to Tertullian, Lactantius and St Basil 
as possible sources.
25) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 71 and 410.
26) Valla, Repastinatio, 46: “Quod cum ita sit, primum predicamentum (ut Boetio libuit) vocetur 
‘substantia’. Nam corpus e materia constat et forma, sive essentia et qualitate, et item animam 
constare conﬁ tendum est”. Cf. 113: “et usitatius multoque accomodatius est vocabulum ‘quali-
tas’ quam ‘forma’, sicut ‘essentia’ quam ‘materia’”. In spite of Valla’s sensitivity to words, he 
struggles with “metaphysical” terms such as substance, essence, matter and quality: in the ﬁ rst 
version he talks of a thing in terms of “consubstance” existing of substance and quality; in the 
later versions this becomes substance existing of essence and quality.
27) Des Chene, Life’s Form, 68 on De anima 412a20.
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that fact.28 Th is argument raises the question of the nature of the relationship 
between substance and quality: is the soul identical with its qualities—that is, 
with its powers—or are they ontologically distinct? Th e scholastics themselves 
were divided on this point. Augustinians had initially argued that the diﬀ er-
ence between the soul and its powers is merely verbal; the soul being identical 
to its powers, these names refer only to the diverse actions of a single entity. 
Once the writings of Avicenna and Averroes became known, scholastic authors 
began to accept the notion of an essential distinction between the soul and its 
powers. Albert the Great and Th omas Aquinas, for instance, described them 
as substance and its qualities or as essence and its accidents.29 Nominalists, 
however, generally maintained the Augustinian line that no real diﬀ erence 
exists.30  
Th ough his overall approach is more Augustinian than Aristotelian, Valla’s 
description of the soul and its capacities as substance and its qualities unwit-
tingly sides with Th omistic teachings against Ockhamist ones.  Qualities can-
not be absent from the substance, but are not identical with it. Nevertheless, 
Valla also says that it is one and the same soul which carries out all the func-
tions assigned to its three powers: memory, reason and will. Memory, Valla 
says, comprehends and retains things. Reason examines and judges them. Will 
desires or rejects them. But, since one and the same soul does all this, it does 
in fact seem as though substance and quality are only diﬀ erent names for the 
soul’s diﬀ erent actions.31 Valla does not draw out fully the consequences of 
28) Valla rejects the notion of substantial form (ed. Zippel, 112-113), but he too must formulate 
a kind of inseparability requirement in order to sort essential qualities out from accidental ones, 
which results in his distinction between “natural” and “non-natural” qualities (113). “Natural 
qualities” comprise both diﬀ erentiae (in their strict sense: distinguishing species within a genus) 
and universal accidents, such as colour, shape, touch and weight. For his idea is that each thing 
must have some colour and shape, and hence be inseparable from its subject, just like heat in ﬁ re. 
But this coupling of diﬀ erent types of “natural qualities” is not unproblematic, for, unlike heat 
in ﬁ re, the existence of colour does not distinguish a species from other species: whiteness does 
not distinguish man from horse. Elsewhere, however, he gives the traditional, strict sense of dif-
ferentia, viz. a quality which distinguishes a species from other species (169). See ch. 1 of my In 
Defense of Common Sense, and, more brieﬂ y, Mack, Renaissance Argument, 46-47.
29) E.g. Albert the Great, De homine I.73.2.2.2; Th omas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-I, q. 77, 
art. 6 (“Utrum potentiae animae ﬂ uant ab eius essentia”). See Pius Künzle, Das Verhältnis der 
Seele zu ihren Potenzen (Freiburg, 1956), 144-218.
30) For Ockham’s arguments concerning the soul and its faculties, see In Libros Sententiarum 
II.24 (Ockham 1981). Cf. Kathleen Park, “Albert’s inﬂ uence on late medieval psychology”, in 
Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, ed. J. A. Weisheipl (Toronto, 1980), 501-535, 517-519 and 
Des Chene, Life’s Form, 143-154 (on the late-scholastic debate).
31) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 66, 75, 410.
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these various statements or of their apparent contradictions. He is very much 
concerned with the unity of the soul, yet he also speaks about its qualities in 
terms of autonomous powers which have the ability to act upon one another. 
Th e will, for instance, is said to teach the intellect—not the converse.32
Th erefore Valla is certainly a dualist; soul and body are very diﬀ erent sub-
stances. For this very reason Valla reacts against the Tree of Porphyry, which 
has substance at the top and its ﬁ rst diﬀ erentiae as corporeal and incorporeal. 
Valla replaces this with multiple trees: one for body, another for soul, and even 
adds a third tree for “animal” which is the composite of the ﬁ rst two.33 Valla 
must then account for how the gap between body and soul is bridged. Th e 
soul permeates the body, he says; it is present in the senses, in the heart and 
throughout the body. It is the soul that perceives. Th e soul (or rather its pow-
ers) therefore inﬂ uences the body. Th e will, for instance, provides the body 
with its warmth, while reason gives the body its ingenuous system of humours 
(solertam distributionem humorum).34 But the soul is also inﬂ uenced by the 
body, e.g. a headache or drunkenness aﬀ ects our mental capacities. When we 
are tired we become angry more easily. Valla does not delve far into how the 
two substances interact, which is hardly surprising given that to this day treat-
ment of the subject remains tricky at best. But his contemporary philosophers 
did raise a question, one which Valla does not consider, concerning what the 
physiological dependency of the soul reveals about the ontological category in 
which it should be placed.35
Valla, however, does make it clear that the soul must not be considered in 
the same manner as one would an ordinary thing. For example, rest and move-
ment are not terms we can apply to the soul, nor, for that matter, to God. 
32) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 411 and elsewhere.
33) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 46-50. Th ough he makes some interesting points, Valla’s own pro-
posal is not without its problems.
34) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 71-72.
35) See Kathleen Park, “Th e organic soul”, in Th e Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, 
ed. C. Schmitt, Q. Skinner and E. Kessler (Cambridge/New York, 1988), 464-484, 468 and Des 
Chene, Life’s Form, 71. On the late-scholastic question of whether soul is substance or accident 
see Des Chene, Life’s Form, 67-102. Valla makes a brief remark on the status of animal soul—
namely that it cannot be a quality, for one may ask: a quality of what thing? Th erefore, it must 
be a substance, which implies that it is “created out of nothing, with divine aid”, rather than 
from “the potency of matter” (65:3-16, a section added only in the third version of the Repasti-
natio). Th e idea that a soul (of whatever type) would depend on or arise out of material body was 
an anathema for Valla. In general, scholastics were less adverse to it, since they generally distin-
guished between human soul (created by God) and other substantial forms (generated by natural 
processes).
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(Accordingly, he ﬁ nds the description of God as the unmoved mover both 
ridiculous and impious). Th e heart receives its vibration, perception and heat 
from the soul; hence the heart is moved more than any other part of the body 
and responsible for the diﬀ usion of the heat, causing bodily eﬀ ects. Neverthe-
less, the soul itself is in neither rest nor movement.36
Yet even Valla cannot avoid terminology that treats the soul an object which 
is capable of various actions. Th us the soul, permeating throughout the body, 
is also present in the senses. Valla here emphasises that the soul can (and often 
does) actively participate in the process of perception, rather than being a 
mere passive recipient of an outside world acting upon it. He thus discusses 
the direction of perception: is it the power of the senses which actively go out 
to meet the objects (a position known as extramission) or, vice versa, are the 
objects sending forth their images to the (passive) senses (intramission).37 Valla 
says that, because the soul is present in the senses, it is much easier for our soul 
to extend, by means of the eye’s rays, to colours than it is for colours to come 
into the eyes. He clearly favours extramission, which he thinks does more 
justice to the autonomous status of the soul than the alternative theory. In 
spite of some ambiguous phrasing, Valla seems to suggest that the soul emits 
its rays via the eyes, which rays, when fallen on an object, are then reﬂ ected 
and received by the eye, the eye functioning as a kind of “mirror” (ad oculum 
velut ad speculum). Th e soul then does not see the rays or images carried 
through the medium, but rather sees the object in its own place, and, the 
sharper and brighter the rays, the better the object is seen. Th is discussion does 
not employ the term “species” or “phantasm”. While the term “imago”, which 
Valla does infrequently use here, is taken over from Lactantius, it does not 
function in the same way. 
Th is choice of words may be a deliberate stratagem on Valla’s part. He 
neglects to mention species and phantasms, and ignores the entire panoply of 
souls and faculties. Valla rejects the existence of a plurality of souls, or as he 
says “the vegetative, sensitive, imaginative and rational souls”.38  He further 
36) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 72. Valla criticises Aristotle here, but both were in fact quite aware 
of the danger of treating the soul as a thing. Before presenting his own theory of the soul, in 
book II of the De anima, Aristotle raised a number of pertinent questions in book I; he criticised 
Plato, for instance, for taking the soul to be a magnitude—not unlike the sort of criticism that 
Valla makes.
37) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 155-156. Valla’s explanation is rather obscure; see Nauta, “Valla’s 
Critique”, and idem, In Defense of Common Sense, ch. 4.
38) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 409. Th e separate mention of the “imaginative soul” is odd, since 
imagination, as one of the internal senses, belongs to the sensitive soul.
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rejects the sensus communis, omitting such faculties as the vis aestimativa and 
imagination.39 Th e result is an uncomplicated, Augustinian depiction of the 
soul as a wholly spiritual and immaterial substance which was made in the 
image of God, and, though it is a unity, consists of memory, intellect and will. 
Th is representation does not explain a number of processes, including sensa-
tion and cognition.
Th is Augustinian representation and his rejection of the vegetative and sen-
sitive souls do have some noteworthy consequences for his ideas about the 
soul of animals, the soul of plants, and about cognition. Of these, the ﬁ rst 
seems to be the most signiﬁ cant.
Men are not alone in possessing a rational soul; animals also do.40 Th e 
debate over whether animals are capable of reason was, of course, longstand-
ing. In classical Antiquity, as Richard Sorabji has shown, the case for animal 
reason was remarkably strong and diverse. Its arguments were based on the 
capacities which animals supposedly had in common with men—namely, per-
ception, memory, preparation, emotion, some form of communicative speech, 
skills, virtues, vices and the liability to madness.41 For Valla the case for animal 
reason was diﬀ erent. It follows from the unity of the soul. Since the capacities 
of the soul are so closely connected, and since animals—like humans—have a 
will and memory, they too must possess a rational soul. As is typical of Valla, 
he also supports his position by introducing linguistic considerations, quoting 
Quintilian, his favourite author. Th e Latin rhetor, arguing that “animals have 
thought and understanding to a certain extent”, had regarded speech as the 
main diﬀ erence between man and animals.42 Valla adds that logos had been 
confused by later philosophers who thought that “a-loga” means “without rea-
son”, though initially it meant only “without speech”. Th e etymology of logos 
from lego (I speak, I say) is further evidence, says Valla. Th us, for him, the 
capacity to speak—rather than the predicate “rational”—distinguishes men 
from animals.
Th is line of argument further implies that animal souls are also created by 
God—thus a substance created from nothing, and not fashioned from pre-
39) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 73.
40) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 67-68.
41) Richard Sorabji, Animal minds and human morals: Th e origin of the Western debate (Ithaca, 
1993), 30-96.
42) Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 2.16.15-16, transl. Russell 2001, vol. 1, 373. Valla presents the 
same argument in his gloss to Quintilian; see L. Valla, Le Postille all’Instituto Oratoria’ di Quinti-
liano, ed. L. Cesarini Martinelli and A. Perosa (Padua, 1996), 70, with the editor’s comment on 
pp. lvii-lviii.
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existing material. Valla claims that all schools of philosophers have denied 
this.43 But what then is the diﬀ erence between human and animal souls? Valla 
answers that the former are directly inspired by God, having been made in his 
image; animal souls do not share this honour. Moreover, though animal souls 
are created with divine aid, they are mortal. Valla thus safeguards the privi-
leged position of the human soul. Nevertheless, his criterion for discriminat-
ing between the two is unclear. What he rejects is the notion that one can 
separate animal from human by distinguishing instinct from reason, which, as 
Valla writes, is “to take shelter under tricks of terminology”.44 Instinct is noth-
ing more than a sort of impulse (impetus), which men also possess when they 
are excited; hence they are called “instincti”. Impulse arises from the will, by 
which assertion Valla subverts the argument that the presence of instinct 
entails a lack of reason. Aristotle, therefore, was wrong, Valla continues, to 
claim that animals and young children lack the power to choose (electio) 
because they lack reason. Th is critique, however, misrepresents Aristotle—per-
haps deliberately, since his opinion was actually that reason develops as chil-
dren grow older—appetite being the primary faculty in the early years of their 
life. In fact, Valla elsewhere quotes Aristotle’s Politics on this tenet.45
A second consequence of Valla’s rejection of the plurality of souls concerns 
the ontological status of plants. While animals are—so to speak—upgraded, 
plants are downgraded; they do not have a soul. Valla draws on the Stoics and 
Epicureans for support, claiming they too denied that plants have an ensouled 
principle, on the grounds that plants lack appetite, soul and reason.46 His view 
was not uncontroversial. Later, Suarez, for instance, wrote that “certain mod-
erns (so I am told) have dared to deny that the vegetative form, considered 
43) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 65.
44) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 67 and 409. A common view, for which Avicenna was an important 
source, was that the seemingly rational behaviour of animals is due to the estimative faculty; Dag 
Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s ‘De anima’ in the Latin West: Th e Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy 
of the Soul 1160-1300 (London/Turin, 2000), 127-53. Aquinas took up Avicenna’s idea that 
animals have a natural estimative faculty, which for instance enables a sheep to apprehend the 
danger of the wolf (Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-I, q. 78, art. 4.; cf. Sorabji, Animal Minds, 64 
and 75, 86 and 113). In the source apparatus Zippel (67:21 ad loc.) cites Paul of Venice’s Liber 
de anima: “apes et formicae . . . agunt solum ex instinctis naturae . . . et ita non proprie agunt 
opera prudentiae, sed solum prudentiae naturalis”.
45) Politics VII.15, 1334b22 (not 1334a17-18 as given by Zippel), quoted at Repastinatio, ed. 
Zippel, 62. Cf. Politics I.13, 1260a12-14 (reason may be complete or incomplete). Th is is part 
of Aristotle’s reply to Plato who had said that some people never acquire reason and others only 
late (Republic 441A-B). See Sorabji, Animal Minds, 70.
46) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 60.
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absolutely [praecise], is a soul; and consequently they deny that plants are 
alive”.47 Valla is correct that Stoics and Epicureans generally denied an 
“ensouled” principle to plants;48 the question of how plants live if not by the 
presence of a soul, however, remains. Valla’s argument drives him to the brink 
of concluding that they actually do not live, but there he seems to hesitate, 
perhaps because such a statement would contradict the ordinary usage of the 
word “live”. Hence, if they must be said to live at all, it can only be said 
“metaphorically” (metaphorice), just as we use “living” (vivus) in other meta-
phorical expressions such as “ﬂ owing water” (aqua viva) and “glowing sul-
phur” (suphur vivum).49 References to plants as “living” in the bible and in 
Gregorius of Nyssa (“they do live but they do not sense”) make him conclude 
that plants may be said to live not by having a soul but by their viriditas 
(greenness or, rather, liveliness or power to grow). If by viriditas Valla means 
the power to grow, as the quotation purportedly suggests, his position may be 
said to come close to Aristotle’s after all, who had assigned souls to plants on 
account of their capacity to feed and reproduce their organic structure.50
A third consequence of his Augustinian picture concerns cognition. Since 
he does not accept the view that objects act on the senses with eﬃ  cient causa-
tion to produce cognition, he cannot accept an abstractionist account of any 
kind. His Augustinian picture would entail that the soul, as an autonomous 
spiritual substance, is capable of directly perceiving universals and ideas. And 
indeed there is one notorious passage in which he seems to accept the Augus-
tinian doctrine of divine illumination. It is however an isolated passage, and it 
remains unclear how Valla envisaged the process of cognition.51
4. Th e Place of Valla’s Critique within Late-Medieval and Renaissance 
Philosophy
Valla’s critique of the Aristotelian-scholastic scientia de anima is characterized 
by a return to an Augustinian picture of the soul as a wholly spiritual and 
immaterial substance which was made in the image of God, consisting of 
memory, intellect and will. His basic conviction is that the soul is a much 
47) Quoted by Des Chene, Life’s Form, 25 n. 31, and cf. 57 n. 10.
48) On ancient arguments for denying souls to plants see Sorabji, Animal Minds, 97-104.
49) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 60.
50) De anima 410b10-15, 416a6-7.
51) See Nauta, “William of Ockham and Lorenzo Valla” and idem, In Defense of Common Sense, 
ch. 2.
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more noble thing than the hylomorphic account of Aristotle implies, at least 
as Valla understands that account. He stresses, therefore, at various places the 
soul’s digniﬁ ed nature, its immortality, unity, autonomy and superior position 
vis-à-vis the body and vis-à-vis animal soul, comparing it to the sun’s central 
place in the cosmos.52
He does not attempt, however, to get a clear picture of Aristotle’s position. 
He cites various works of Aristotle, especially in the later revisions of his work 
when he has become acquainted with the Aristotelian works more thoroughly, 
but his use of them is highly selective. We ﬁ nd quotations from De anima, De 
generatione animalium, De partibus animalium (called De membris anima-
lium), the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics.53 He thinks the Aristotelian 
account defends a plurality of souls, and that Aristotle holds a composite 
nature of the soul consisting of a rational and an irrational part (here he quotes 
the Politica). He attacks Aristotle for his view that the soul is mortal, though 
he also notes that other statements of Aristotle favour immortality (of the 
rational part, which strongly presupposes a composite nature, which Valla 
rejects).54 Another example of a rather tendentious handling has already been 
mentioned, i.e. where Valla suggests that Aristotle held the view that animals 
and young children lack the power to choose (electio) because they lack reason. 
But Aristotle’s opinion was clearly that reason develops as children grow older; 
appetite is the primary faculty in the early years of their life. Earlier Valla him-
self uses a quotation from Aristotle’s Politics which reﬂ ects his knowledge of 
Aristotle’s true intention, but Valla does not apply that knowledge in this case. 
He thus gives priority to his polemical aims rather than applying his impres-
sive skills in philology, Greek and Latin scholarship to Aristotle’s text.
While Aristotle is at least cited, the same cannot be said of the scholastics. 
Valla neglects even to mention Albert the Great, Th omas Aquinas, William of 
Ockham, John Buridan, Albert of Saxony or other medieval scholastics in his 
book, though there is evidence which suggests he had some familiarity with 
them and their works.55 He omits discussion of the wealth of questions that 
52) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 71.
53) I have not yet found out which translation he used; it is not the Moerbeke translation or the 
version of Moerbeke used by Aquinas. Valla used Leonardo Bruni’s translations of the Ethics and 
Politics when they became available to him in the 1440s.
54) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 61-62.
55) In a letter to his friend Serra Valla lists some scholastic authors: “aut illos dialecticos, Alber-
tum utrunque, Strodem, Occam, Paulum Venetum” (Valla, Epistole, ed. O. Besomi and 
M. Regoliosi (Padua, 1984), 20). Th is list too does not necessarily imply that Valla was well 
acquainted with their works, as I have argued in my forthcoming book against a number of Valla 
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scholastic authors posed on the soul, its powers, and on the processes of cogni-
tion and sensation, and poses no argument against the panoply of the soul’s 
faculties and functions. If he is acquainted with concepts such as sensible and 
intelligible species, intuitive and abstract cognition, he prefers to be silent 
about them. Th us, primarily by neglecting the processes of sensation and cog-
nition, he succeeds in simplifying them. 
Th is simpliﬁ cation, particularly the notion of direct perception, has led 
scholars to liken Valla’s position to Ockham’s rejection of sensible species as 
intermediaries in the process of perceiving. But, as I have noted, Valla’s discus-
sion does not contain the term “species” or “phantasms”, nor does it mention 
Ockham’s notions of intuitive and abstract cognition. Ockham may have sug-
gested, as Eleanore Stump writes, that for intuitive cognition “there are no 
mechanisms or processes. Th ere is just direct epistemic contact between the 
cognizer and the thing cognized”.56 Direct cognition cannot be explained, 
precisely because it is direct and thus deﬁ es further analysis. Such assumptions 
may also account for Valla’s omission. But it is nevertheless important to realise 
that, unlike Ockham, he does not seem to be motivated by epistemological 
considerations. Valla rather is concerned with the intramission theory of per-
ception, which he feels would jeopardize the soul’s noble and autonomous 
nature. Th at age-old debate on intramission versus extramission is in fact the 
direct context of his remarks, and his question about the direction of percep-
tion unrelated to Ockham’s theory. Hence it incorrect to claim, as Trinkaus 
has done, that Valla “is undoubtedly referring” to the scholastic controversy 
about the existence and nature of sensible species.57 Valla would agree that 
there is direct contact between cognizer and object, and that—insofar as it is 
direct and immediate contact—it requires no explanation. However, he would 
not allow, as Ockham does, that there are two souls—a rational and sensitive 
one. Valla is quite ﬁ rm on the point of one soul. Th us Ockham’s theory would 
be as unacceptable to Valla as any other scholastic theory.
Valla’s account does contain some echoes of certain scholastic debates—
namely on the relationship between soul and its powers and on the ontological 
scholars, some of them going so far to say that the Repastinatio makes “knowing, careful use of 
scholastic terminology and methods of argumentation” or that “Valla meant seriously to remake 
scholastic metaphysics on its own terms” (W. J. Connell, “Lorenzo Valla: A Symposium. Intro-
duction”, Journal of the History of Ideas 57 (1996), 1-7, at 5.
56) Eleanor Stump, “Th e Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham on Mediating Species”, in Th e 
Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. P. V. Spade, (Cambridge/New York, 1999), 168-203, 
184; cf. 194-95.
57) Charles Trinkaus, “Lorenzo Valla’s Anti-Aristotelian Natural Philosophy”, 301.
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status of the soul. Nevertheless these are very faint; it is doubtful that he did 
more than leaf through some of the scholastic works. As I have argued else-
where, in spite of the common interpretation of Valla as a rhetorical follower 
of Ockham, no more than this same glancing knowledge is present in Valla’s 
entire critique of Aristotelian-scholastic metaphysic and dialectic. 
But if one scarcely engages in critical discussion of a paradigm, can one 
transform it? Some modern historians make much of Valla’s approach in his 
chapter on the natural world.58 As mentioned in the introduction, they argue 
that Valla foreshadowed the later developments in natural philosophy which 
helped to dismantle scholasticism. (Foreshadowing, however, does not neces-
sitate inﬂ uencing.) Frequently appealing to daily experience and observation, 
Valla’s approach shows a kind of naïve empiricism. He rejects or qualiﬁ es a 
number of fundamental tenets of Aristotelian natural philosophy—namely 
that movement is the cause of warmth, that one movement is always caused 
by another, that elements can be transformed into one another, that each ele-
ment has its own proper qualities (ﬁ re is warm and dry, air warm and moist, 
etc.), that pure elements exist, and that the combination of warmth and 
humidity is suﬃ  cient for the generation of life.59 Valla’s rejections often have 
the character of a reductio ad absurdum; if Aristotle’s theory were true, one 
would expect quite diﬀ erent phenomena than those one observes. For instance, 
Aristotle’s argument for the existence of a ﬁ ery sphere below the moon claimed 
that “leaden missiles shot out by force liquefy in the air”.60 Valla counters this 
by appealing to common experience. In daily life, we never see balls—whether 
leaden, iron or stone shot out of a sling or a cannon—heat up in the air; even 
the feathers of launched arrows do not catch ﬁ re.61 Later Galileo would use a 
similar argument.62 However, does this warrant the conclusion that Valla 
occupies a place in the tradition of Renaissance naturalism or in early modern 
science?
Valla’s appeal to the senses rather has a polemical aim of showing that Aris-
totelian natural philosophy makes, as he believes, gratuitous assumptions 
about things which transcend the boundary of sense and introduces terms and 
concepts which are far removed from our daily, ordinary picture of the natural 
58) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 98-110. See above n. 6-9.
59) Cf. Mack, Renaissance Argument, 69, who lists a number of points on which Valla contradicts 
Aristotle, but natural philosophy falls outside the scope of his study. For discussion see Nauta, In 
Defense of Common Sense, ch. 4.
60) De caelo II.7, 289a26-28.
61) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 98-99.
62) Trinkaus, “Lorenzo Valla’s Anti-Aristotelian Natural Philosophy”, 288 n. 15.
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world. His “empiricism” is not an invitation to collect as much data as possible 
and investigate the workings of nature but rather serves as a curb on specula-
tion, as an antidote against what he sees as the presumptions and pretensions 
of the philosophers, who are too inquisitive about God’s artistry (artiﬁ cium). 
For Valla it should be enough to know that God made the stars, the heavens 
and the elements at the beginning of time: we will learn about his artistry in 
the next life. God did not need the spinning of the spheres in order to create 
the elements and give them their place. He is not bound by the principle that 
nothing can arise out of nothing, as is shown by the nature of ﬁ re. But Valla 
was smart enough to use the Bible as source of positive knowledge about 
nature when it suited him: the biblical account of the creation of man from 
mud, which is soil soaked in water, is presented as evidence against the view 
that the human body consists of all the four elements.63
To evaluate Valla’s relationship with later Renaissance naturalist thinkers, 
let us brieﬂ y consider his argument that animals also have a rational soul.64 
Th is argument does not rest on a consistently naturalist approach towards 
men as part of the natural world. Valla still adheres to an Augustinian account 
of the creation of man’s soul, a reﬂ ection of the Trinity. As mentioned above, 
Valla rather inconsistently ascribes to animals a soul similarly created by divine 
aid. Moreover, a theory of cognition is conspicuously absent from his work. 
A theory of cognition, however, was of central concern to the scholastics and 
to those early modern philosophers, such as Telesio and Hobbes, advancing 
toward a mechanistic-naturalist philosophy. Hobbes reduced sense per-
ception to local motions in the body caused by external objects. Th e under-
standing is thus nothing but a special form of the imagination which man 
shares with animals.65 Telesio had previously argued that the intellect is a con-
tinuation of the senses, and that the diﬀ erence between man and animals is 
thus of degree only—“human spirit being more ﬁ ne and copious than that of 
other animals”.66 Th erefore, since Valla does not present any serious alternative 
63) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 98 (God’s artistry), 100 (spinning of spheres), 102 (nature of ﬁ re), 
109 (four elements).
64) Th e term “naturalism” however is rather vague and should be used with caution; for some 
pertinent comments see Bianchi, “Continuity and Change in the Aristotelian Tradition”, 68.
65) Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 2, ed. Molesworth, 11. For Hobbes’ debt to Renaissance naturalistic 
thinkers see Cees Leijenhorst, Th e Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: Th e Late Aristotelian Setting 
of Th omas Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy, (Leiden, 2002).
66) Quoted by Karl Schuhmann, “Hobbes and Telesio”, Hobbes Studies 1 (1988), 109-133, 116 
from Telesio’s De rerum natura iuxta propria principia. Telesio distinguished between an intellec-
tive, immortal soul (only in men) and an organic soul (spiritus); see Daniel P. Walker, Spiritual 
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for the scholastic and naturalist accounts of sensation and cognition, it is by 
no means intuitive that he should be regarded as having “a place as part of the 
internal dissidence within the dominant natural philosophy” of his own age.67
Furthermore, hardly any evidence suggests that Valla is on the road to an 
“empirismo razionalistico moderno”.68 Valla writes that one and the same soul 
retains, judges, and wills. Th is is reminiscent of Descartes, who states likewise 
in the Meditations.69 But Descartes came to his dualism by another road—by 
rethinking the scholastic theories and notions. Moreover, Valla’s work has no 
equivalent for Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas or for his method of doubt. 
Valla and Descartes thus appropriated Augustinian representations of the soul 
in diverse manners. 
We should, therefore, resist the temptation to assess Valla, an early critic of 
Aristotle, in terms of the agendas of later critics. Valla was not developing an 
alternative to Aristotelian natural philosophy, and hence did not—as is often 
claimed—contribute to a “new mentality” or “a new mental environment”, at 
least insofar as “mentality” cultivated mathematical, empirical, naturalist and 
mechanist strands of thought in the Renaissance.
But even though his attitude and position on natural philosophical themes 
usually do not bear any structural likeness with those of later naturalist phi-
losophers, yet it can be argued that Valla gave vent to a sentiment which 
ultimately eroded faith in the Aristotelian system. Valla rightly saw that Aris-
totle’s conclusions could not be made to square with everyday observations. 
Moreover, with hindsight we can see that any undermining of the faith in 
scholastic-Aristotelian world view contributed to its demise and ﬁ nally to its 
replacement by a diﬀ erent, mechanistic one. Valla surely contributed to this 
and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (London, 1958), 190-194. Against hermetic 
teachings, Patrizi argues that animals have a rational soul; Nova de universis Philosophia, dis-
cussed by K. Schuhmann, Selected papers on Renaissance philosophy and on Th omas Hobbes, eds. 
P. Steenbakkers and C. Leijenhorst (Dordrecht, 2004), 157-170, 164.
67) Trinkaus, “Lorenzo Valla’s Anti-Aristotelian Natural Philosophy”, 322, but he is careful to 
admit that “it would be hard to outline his own natural philosophy in positive terms” (324); 
moreover, Valla “is pre-Copernican, pre-Keplerian, pre-Galilean” (322-23). It is much more dif-
ﬁ cult to agree with Trinkaus that Valla’s criticisms of Aristotelian doctrines “are the result of both 
his familiarity with natural phenomena and his knowledge of scholastic teachings, together with 
his concentrated thinking about them” (325).
68) Fubini, “Contributo per l’interpretazione”, 316.
69) Repastinatio, ed. Zippel, 75. Cf. Descartes, Meditation VI: “it is one and the same mind that 
wills and understands and has sensory perceptions”; R. Descartes, Th e Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, transl. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoﬀ , and D. Murdoch, 2 vols. (Cambridge/New York, 
1984-85), vol. II, 59.
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necessary preparatory stage of doubting the Aristotle’s authority. Th ough he 
does not mention Valla, Menn’s judgement on humanist anti-Aristotelianism 
may be applied to Valla too: “though their ﬁ rst steps towards a new philosophy 
were stumbling and may be compared unfavourably with the accomplish-
ments of late scholasticism, we may see with hindsight that their bold experi-
ments prepared the way for the emergence of mechanical philosophy and 
science”.70
In short, Valla’s critique proved a necessary step in dismantling of a domi-
nant paradigm; it helped to undermine faith in Aristotle and the Aristotelian-
scholastic approach. His rejections are often based on linguistic grounds, and 
extend to philosophical speculation and theorizing, as well as many scholastic 
entities, distinctions and terms. While this is typical of a humanist, Valla’s 
critique went well beyond the usual diatribe on their opponents’ so-called 
barbarous and ungrammatical Latin. Language, for Valla, cannot be abstracted 
from the living context in which it functions and from which it derives its 
meaning and power. Words and arguments should not be taken out of con-
text, for doing so alters their normal, common meaning—consequently giv-
ing rise to philosophical problems where none previously existed. Th is, 
according to Valla, is precisely what the philosopher does. Philosophical spec-
ulation—with its technical abstruse, vague and esoteric vocabulary, with its 
tendency to disregard the grammatical rules and conventions of the Latin 
language—soon takes on a life of its own. Leaving the world of common 
experience far behind, the philosopher employs terminology which can only 
be handled and understood by other philosophers. Against this, Valla champi-
ons the ordinary conception (or “folk” conception as modern philosophers 
would say) of the world and of the way it is reﬂ ected in classical Latin. He thus 
takes issue with what he considers the philosophers’ ﬁ cta, their abstractions 
and theories, which take concepts and terms out of their ‘ordinary’ semantic 
network. Hence, Valla’s critique of scholastic thought is essentially a critique 
of their language, consciously and deliberately so. Th is important insight can 
also be found in many later philosophers, and is prominent, for instance, in 
70) Menn, “Intellectual Setting”, 47. In this sense then Fubini may be said to be right. A related 
but by no means identical factor in the decline of Aristotelianism is what has been called “her-
meneutic hypertrophy”: an immense increase of knowledge—or even overkill—of Aristotle’s 
works and its late-antique and medieval commentators, well attested by a huge number of edi-
tions, translations and commentaries. Th is ultimately led to a watering down of the contours of 
what was once a powerful paradigm. See L. Bianchi, Studi sull’Aristotelismo del Rinascimento 
(Padua, 2003), 136. Of course, external factors (e.g. discoveries of natural phenomena) were also 
very important.
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the work of Th omas Hobbes. (But, one may add, scholastic pilosophers were 
the ﬁ rst to recognize the potential fallacies which arise from their technical 
terminology.)
Th us, in ﬁ ghting the Aristotelian paradigm, Valla often appealed to com-
mon sense and everyday experiences and observations. For him, the wisdom 
of the common people took priority over philosophical analyses. Philosophi-
cal analysis is doomed to failure because its aims at reﬁ ning ‘folk’ notions by 
speculative argument, empty theorising, and making unwarranted claims 
which transcend the boundaries of sense experience and common sense. It is 
not diﬃ  cult to throw doubt on the legitimacy of this contrast. Th e concerns 
and questions of philosophers are simply diﬀ erent, and aim at the elucidation 
and analysis of concepts. Th us, for those following the Aristotelian dialectical 
method, common opinions, common-sense intuitions, and some daily obser-
vations are important, but only as a starting point for rational criticism, reﬂ ec-
tion, and generalization. By this process one arrives at a correct account of the 
phenomenon. Valla, however, would retort, that this later stage of rational 
criticism and reﬂ ection has degenerated into a language game which hardly 
bears any relationship to the world it allegedly attempts to analyse. One may 
turn up one’s nose in contempt of such convictions, but this particular convic-
tion does in fact surface at various points in history and undeniably has philo-
sophical relevance.
Valla’s importance should not, therefore, be sought at the level of argument; 
frequently his engagement with philosophical enemies or straw-men pierced 
little more than skin-deep. Rather, his importance lies in recognizing that a 
complete change of paradigm was required. Th is is far from easy to accom-
plish, as his work bears out—particularly in his chapter on the soul. Valla may 
have thought that his Augustinian representation of the soul was more simple 
and truer to both human experience and Christian faith. Nevertheless he is 
unable to avoid making a number of statements which, on closer analysis, are 
not so simple, common or straightforward. Even “common sense” is shot 
through with philosophical assumptions, and thus it continues—fortu-
nately—to be the job of the philosopher to articulate and analyse these 
assumptions and convictions.71
71) I am grateful to Pamela Zinn for stylistic suggestions.
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